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Abstract 
 Indonesia’s consumer law protection has adopted class action 
procedure as a strategic response to consumers’ access to justice in the 
1990s. When it was applied in some consumer cases in Indonesia, most of 
them failed with the cost barrier to notify all class members as the main 
factor. 
Based on Watson point of view of divergent element in the comparative law 
study, this article first, examines the difficulties facing those who 
commencing consumers’ class action in Indonesia. Second,  looks to 
Australian procedural law and practices to explore whether similar problems 
exist. Third,  make use of it comparatively to overcome the cost barrier in 
Indonesia. 
Looking at some Australian provisions and practices, and with respect to the 
Indonesian situation, it analized that the solution to the cost barrier in 
consumers’ class actions for Indonesian litigants may be expressed in the 
terms of: 
1. Optimizing the principles of having ‘the judges involved’ and ‘the 
efficiency of justice’ to arrange the most efficient way of notifying all 
group members; 
2. Supporting the growth of commercial litigation funders based on rules;  
3. Establishing a funding support body, like, the class action funding 
support agency by the Government,  
The two main litigation funders,  the commercial funder and the class action 
funding support agency, then may work in harmony. Where a class action 
lawsuit cannot be supported financially by the commercial funder, it may be 
supported by the  class action funding support agency.  
 
                                                 
12 Article based on research funded by DITJEN.DIKTI of Education and Culture 
Departement of Republic Indonesia, through PAR-C scheme 2011, and has been represented 
on 14 th  International Association of Consumers Law Conference, 2-4 July 2013, Sydney-
Australia. 
European Scientific Journal   November 2013  edition vol.9, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
98 
Keywords: litigation cost of class action,  Indonesia, Australia, litigation 
funding 
 
Introduction 
 Indonesia has adopted class actions to consumer law protection,13 and 
eventually provided for it more generally by the Supreme Court through the 
Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002 (Ind).  
Although some consumer’ class actions were commenced in 
Indonesia in the decade since adoption, most have failed. One of the reasons 
for this failure has been the cost associated with commencing class actions.14 
For instances, in Seven consumers v Guyub Raharjo Co,15 and in the 12 
Activists v Minister of Economic of Indonesia cs,16   
Looking at R2 of the Supreme Court Rules, No 1 of 2002 (Ind), it can 
be said that Indonesia tends to follow the United States and Australian class 
proceeding regime.17 This article discusses the cost barrier faced in 
commencing class action in Indonesia and considers some legal 
argumentation and legal comparation (from the Australian provisions)  to see 
if they help overcome that cost barrier.18  Watson argues that legal adoption 
                                                 
13  See, r46(1) of The Consumer’s Protection Act No 8 of 1999 
14  The cost aspect as an obstacle also faced by another Asian Country, Malayisa. See, Yeow 
Choi Choong & Sujata Balan, Class Actions in Malaysia: Principles and Procedural 
Obstacles, a paper in The Globalization of Class Actions Conference (Oxford, England, 
12 – 14 December, 2007) 13, Available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/ display/images/ 
dynamic/ events_media/Malaysia_National_Report.pdf, 10 October 2011.  
15 See, cn 11/Pdt.G/2002/Sleman General Court, unreported. In this case, seven consumers 
of an investement product of Guyub Raharjo Co commenced lawsuit on behalf of their 
own and  another 1300 potential consumers interest. They alleged Guyub Raharjo had 
absconded the consumers’investment funds  in breache of  the Consumers’ Protection 
Act No 8 of  1999 (Ind). 
16 See, cn 335/Pdt.G/2005/Central Jakarta General Court, unreported. In this case, several 
activists brough class action lawsuit on behalf of them selves and all Indonesian citizens 
interest based on allegation that Minister of Economic Departement of Indonesia 
breached the civil right and the good governance by increasing the fuel expence on 
October 1th, 2005 unwisely without regard that it created more poor condition to 
Indonesian citizen. 
17  Based on the comparison of  r2 of the Supreme Court Rules No 1of 2002(Ind), r23(a) of 
the Federal Court of    Civil Procedure 1966 (US), and r33(C) Pt.IVA of the Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976(Cth). 
18  The result of study to the foreign law comparatively can be used as an input to make a 
law reform to the other country. See also, Sidhartha, The Reflection of the Legal 
Jurisprudence’ Structure (Refleksi Tentang Struktur Ilmu Hukum), (Mandar Maju, 
Bandung,  2000) 128.  
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can take place even though there are differences between legal systems, with 
one system serving as a model to be imitated by the other. 19 
In part one of this article, the ways in which cost is a barrier in 
consumer’class action practices, how they confronted the problem,  the 
judge’s role and the Government’s responsibility, are discussed and analysed 
in detail, to examine who deals with the cost problem in class actions. In the 
second part, the article will describe the Australian approach to consumer’ 
class action to describe how they have overcome the cost problem. The third 
and last part will consider some legal argumentation and the Australian 
provisions, to see if they might be adapted and adopted in light of Indonesian 
experiences, to help overcome the cost barrier faced when commencing 
consumer’ class actions.  
 
Part One: the Cost Problem of Consumer’ Class Action in Indonesia 
 The right to commence consumer’class action in Indonesia can be 
seen in R46(1)b of the Consumer Protection Act No.8 of 1999, that states: 
‘The Civil lawsuit againts Corporate can be comemenced by a group of 
consumers that have the same interest.’  
How class actions work in Indonesia can be seen in the Supreme Court Rules 
No 1 of 2002 (Ind) that applies to all courts. R2(2) of The Supreme Court 
Rules No 1 of 2002(Ind), states: 
‘The lawsuit can be commenced in representative or class proceeding if: 
a. The class or group of members is so numerous, that it is not efficient to be 
commenced individually or by joinder;  
b. The representative party and all the group he/she represents have common 
facts or circumtances, legal issue substantially, and seek the same relief;  
c. The representative party represents and protects the interest of all group 
members adequately and fairly;   
d. The court may advise to replace the lawyer if he/she contravenes with 
his/her duty to protect the interest of the group members.’20 
Based on r5(4) of the Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002 (Ind), once a 
lawsuit is certificated as class action, the representative plaintiff is 
immediately required to notify all potential members of the lawsuit, and give 
them an opportunity to opt out if they disagree with the filing of the class 
action.21 The Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002 (Ind) does not provide for 
who should pay the cost of filing class action lawsuit at the 
beginning. Accordingly, the general  principle of the cost of bringing civil 
litigation as constituted on r121(4) of Het Herziene Indonesisch Reglement, 
                                                 
19  See, Alan Watson, Legal Transplants And European Private Law, (Univerzitet u 
Beogradu, Pravni Fakultet, Belgrade, 2006) 6-7. 
20    Available at  http://www.elsam.or.id/pdf/kursusham/PERMA_No_1_Tahun_2002.pdf. 
21    See, r7(2)a, and r7(3) of the Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002(Ind). 
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Staatblad No 44 of 1941 (Ind), has been implemented: the cost for filing the 
lawsuit should be paid in the beginning by the plaintiff, as the initiator.  
 The representative plaintiff in consumer’class actions,  has to retain 
approximately Rp510 000 to Rp615 000 in the beginning, coupled with the 
cost to notify all potential members immediately as the suit is certified as a 
class action by the court.  
Looking into the advertisement fare, the cost to notify all potential 
members in consumer’class action through the national newspaper is 
approximately Rp17 550 000 (AUD1907.6) to Rp26 550 000 (AUD 2885.8) 
to do so for 150mmX200mm format advertisement.22 The cost to notify all 
potential members in consumer’class action is costly, almost a hundred per 
cent of the total legal cost in general. It seems burdening for consumers to 
initiate a class action, since she/he should bear the cost of notification to all 
members that is approximately 21.7 times of her/his wages a month, while 
her/his claim was small. In respect of a consumer representative plaintiff, it 
becomes cheaper to sue individually, because he/she only pays about Rp566 
000 (AUD61.5) to Rp615 000 (AUD66.8) along with her/his solicitor cost.23 
Rowe Jr. noted that the implementation of the rule that ‘the loser should pay’ 
in class actions raises major problems for the representative plaintiff of the 
group, since he or she must pay the defendant’s costs, including the cost of 
his/her lawyer.24  
One of the objectives of adopting consumer’class actions in 
Indonesia is to abandon the defficiency of the administration of justice for a 
group of consumers as parties in joinder. With this in mind, the simplicity 
and efficiency of class actions ought always to be borne in mind. 
1. Learning from some cases in Indonesia 
 The representative plaintiffs in Seven consumers v Guyub Raharjo Co 
and in 12 activists v Minister of Economic of Indonesia cs, had no money to 
pay the cost of notifying all potential members of the group of consumers so 
the action was stopped. In Seven consumers v Guyub Raharjo Co, the judges 
                                                 
22  Interpretated by the author, from  Kompas Newspaper’s advertisement fare at Display 
Klasika-BW-prize and Display-BW-prize, http://www.pasangiklan.com/tarifiklan, 20 
September 2011.  
23 Based on provision of Penetapan Ketua Pengadilan Negeri Wates Nomor: 
W13.U3/550/HK.02/V/2010 (Ind); Penetapan Ketua Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Utara 
Nomor: W10-U4/2767/HK.02/VI/2010 (Ind); Based on Rule 123 of the Het Herziene 
Indonesisch Reglement, Staatblad No 44 of 194,  Indonesia has the principle that the 
applicant should not be represented by the lawyer  in filing lawsuit. But recently, most of 
the lawsuits filed represently by lawyer. 
24  D Rowe, Jr, Jr, Debate Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We 
Learn from Each Other?, dalam Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol 
11, No 2 (Spring/Summer 2001) 158, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journal/djcl. 
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order the representative plaintiffs to notify all 1300 potential members of the 
class through the local and national newspaper. It would cost Rp13 000 000 
to do so. The consumer representative plaintiffs did not do this. Among the 
reasons were that the cost burdened them and were not proportionate with 
the damages they would receive if the case were settled successfully. Of the 
Rp13 000 000 for notification, each of the consumer representative plaintiffs 
should share Rp1 857 142 from the total cost of notification (plus the other 
proceeding cost), while apportioned damages being claimed were on average 
Rp2 000 000 to Rp8 000 000.25  
The lawyer asked the judges whether the way of notification could 
changed to the local newspaper (Yogyakarta Province), and the national 
radio (Radio of Republic Indonesia), arguing they were more efficient. The 
judges did not agree to this request as many of the potential members lived 
outside  Yogyakarta Province, and notification through the radio would not 
satisfy the notification provision.26 
The consumer representative plaintiffs asked their Lawyer from the 
Legal Aid Foundation, whether they could pay upfront for the cost that will 
later be repaid were the case to be settled successfully.27 The Lawyers’ Legal 
Aids Foundation did not agree to do so, since it was uncommon to make an 
agreement like that, and  it would have greatly reduced the Foundation’s 
budget28 It seems that the Lawyer’s Legal Aid Foundation did not want to 
face the risk of not being able to recover the cost of notification. 
In 12 activists v Minister of Economic of Indonesia cs, the 
representative plaintiff failed to fulfil the requirement to notify all potential 
class members through the local and national newspaper, as the judges 
ordered, which would have cost approximately Rp24 000 000. One of the 
reasons was that the representative plaintiffs had no funds to do so. They 
applied to change the way of notification to using the Internet, but the judges 
did not accept the application, as most of the potential members would not 
have been reached given they are yet to gain access to the Internet29  
Two points are to be made. First, did the plaintiffs truly lack the 
funds to notify potential members? Could they not account for that cost from 
the funds of their advocacy? In fact, of 12 activists two were members from 
                                                 
25  Based on the pleading in consumers v Guyub Raharjo Co 
26   Based on interview with the Lawyer, on 8 Janaury 2006. 
27 Legal Aid Foundation (LBH-Ind) is a non-profit foundation, held by non government 
organization or by the Faculty of Law, serving for pro bono legal assistance to the 
persons with disability socially or economically. See, The history or profile of YLBHI 
and LBH Jakarta, at http://www.ylbhi.or.id/index.php?cx=1; Also 
http://www.bantuanhukum.or.id/index.php/id/ profile/sejarah.  
28   From the interview with the lawyer, on 8 January 2006. 
29    From the interviewe with the Lawyer, 6 August 2007. 
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non-government organizations that actually should provide sufficient funds 
for their action, but the others were personal activists, including two student 
activists, two women activists, two labour activists, youth leader activists, 
and two artists. They did not try to make such an agreement to bear the cost 
together. Second, the Internet as a way to notify is more efficient, but might 
be unjust for some members of the potential class and consequently be in 
breach of the provision. It also can be argued that even Indonesian activists 
are still burdened by the cost of notification. 
Moreover, the Internet can be a more efficient means of notifying a 
very large number of potential members to a class action and therefore form 
an alternative solution to the cost barrier. On the other hand,  not all of the 
regions of Indonesia can be reached by the Internet, so as a technology, it has 
limited usage. Generally it was a good idea for the representative plaintiffs in 
12 activists v Minister of Economic of Indonesia, cs to use the Internet as an 
alternative to overcome the cost barrier. However, it remains arguably unjust 
and ineffective.  
Based on these two cases, there is a contradiction: generally speaking 
class action is more efficient than individual or joinder proceeding, but the 
representative plaintiff still faces the cost barrier of notifying all potential 
members. There is more to be learned regarding potential solutions from the 
cases below.   
In Harun Al Rasyid (KOMPARTA) v Thames PAM Jaya, Ltd, there 
were 800 potential group members of consumers.30 After being certificated 
as a class action, the judges ordered the consumer representative plaintiffs to 
notify all 800 potential members of the group through the local newspaper. 
The lawyer faced the burdensome cost of doing so. They refused to do so as 
it was expensive to notify all potential members that live in Jakarta through 
the local newspaper. Instead, they asked the judges that notification be 
through the notice boards at all five drinking-water agency offices. The 
judges recognized their application and changed the order. The judges 
considered that the way to notify 800 potential members of KOMPARTA 
through the notice board at all five  drinking-water agency offices was still 
acceptable to the potential class members and pursuant to r1no 12 and r7(2) 
of The Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002 (Ind). The representative plaintiffs 
then notified all 800 potential members using the notice boards free of 
                                                 
30 See, cn 276/Pdt.G/2003/Central-Jakarta General Court, unreported. In this case, Harun al 
Rasyid as a member of KOMPARTA and other seven members, on behalf of them selves 
and other members of KOMPARTA (Association of Jakarta Drinking-Water 
Consumers) interest brough  a lawsuit against Thames PAM Jaya Ltd, Palya Ltd. and 
Governor of Jakarta, on the allegation that the defendants did negligence by having bad 
service or doing nothing in facing bad quality of the drink water, so that in common 
circumtances were caused injury and damages to KOMPARTA as their consumers.  
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charge.31 With innovative lawyers and judges willing to entertain their 
suggestions, we can reach appropriate solutions to overcome the cost barrier. 
In this case indirect notification to 800 members that lived in the same and 
certain region through the notice board created efficiency in the proceeding, 
since it was served and announced at the five offices. This was done in a day 
and there was no expense to do so. The cost barrier can be overcome by 
choosing the most efficient way of notification, but only in a limited 
situation. 
In J Nurjaman v Sarana Jaya,Ltd, the total number of the protential 
members was only 62 persons.32 The lawyer notified all members directly by 
inviting them, since  they were living close by.33 The cost was only Rp510 
000 (AUD55.4).34  Based on that case, direct notification can still be 
efficient and give the optimum result. However, it has limited use. It may be 
used in cases where there are small numbers of identified potential members 
that live in close proximity. Direct notification cannot be used in cases of 
large numbers of non identified potential members that live in a widespread 
area.  Given the two cases described above, it can be argued that the cost 
barrier can be overcome by choosing  the most efficient way of notification, 
but only in a limited situation: with a small number of  potential members 
who live in close proximity and the same region.  
Based on some cases above, it can be said that the cost to notify the 
potential members in class actions is costly, especially through the 
newspaper, with that cost being almost the same as the total legal costs in 
general. It is a burden on consumer representative plaintiffs and a 
discouragement. An alternative solution could be made by the consumer 
representative plaintiffs inviting other group members to lighten the burden 
of cost. Alternatives such as choosing a more efficient way of notification, 
for example through use of notice boards, direct notification or  the Internet 
have some limitation might be unjust. A cost agreement between client and 
lawyer, as an alternative to assist with the cost of notification in class actions 
is still uncommon in Indonesia. Although Indonesian Legal Aid Institutes 
                                                 
31  As seen in the expenditure document they kept to notify  in cn 276/Pdt.G/2003/Central-
Jakarta General Court, unreported. They only incurre for the transportation expense, and 
publish the notification for free of charge. 
32 See, cn 580/Pdt.G/ 2006/South Jakarta General Court, unreported. In this case, J 
Nurjaman as an occupant of Tebet Flat on behalf of him self and all  occupants of Tebet 
Flat brough a lawsuit against Sarana Jaya Ltd,  in allegation that the defendants did 
negligence and breached the civil right of the occupants since the management 
transferred from Governor of Jakarta to Sarana Jaya Ltd and Karya Cipta Karsa Ltd, by 
raising the flat fare unilaterally, so that burdened the occupants as poor people and leak 
them to get the cheap housing, as the objetive of developing that Flat.  
33 From interview on 7 September 2007. 
34   Based on the interviewed with the lawyer and the expenditure documents in the case. 
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fund legal action, it is not enough to finance the cost of class action 
regularly. 
 
2. The Jugdes’ role. 
 The judges have a role to ‘play-the game’ efficiently. Indonesia has 
the principle of ‘the judge should become involved’, that implicitly can be 
seen in r4(2) of the Fundamental of the Judiciary Power Act, No 48 of  2009 
(Ind), that states: ‘The court should assist litigants and make every effort to 
overcome all obstacles to meet the aims of a simple, speedy and cheap 
resolution of proceedings’. R132 of The Het Herziene Indonesisch 
Reglement, Staatblad 1941 No 4 or r156 of The Rects Reglement Buiten 
Gewijsten, Staatblad 1927, No 227, also expresses that principle, which 
states that ‘[t]he judges should assist litigants who do not understand the 
procedures in filing a lawsuit’. These provisions express that the judges have 
a role to promote the ‘efficiency of justice’ principle. 
One of the components pursuant to r2a of the Supreme Court Rule No 
1 of 2002(Ind), is that class action may be chosen if it creates more efficient  
procedure than joinder action. It expresses the efficiency principle. That 
principle should be wisely and precisely assessed by the judge. Included in 
this assessment ought to be the efficiency of the means of notifying all group 
members pursuant to r7(1) of the Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002(Ind).  
Otherwise, the judges may order an inappropriate way to notify all members 
that may create inefficiency.35 
With reference to the experience of some cost barrier cases discussed 
before, the principles of ‘the judge should be involved’ and ‘the efficiency of 
justice’ can be optimized to overcome the cost barrier in consumer’class 
action: (1) by giving advice to the consumer representative plaintiff to invite 
other group members to join as representative plaintiffs,  and (2) by having 
the ability to define the means of notification with regard the number and the 
region of the group members.  
 
3. The Government’ legal aid scheme  
 The Indonesian Government is concerned with assisting poor 
litigitants’ access to justice. Rule 56(2) of the Fundamental of the Judiciary 
Power Act, No 48 of 2009 (Ind) provides that: ‘The government bears the 
                                                 
35    See, in Harun Al Rasyid (KOMPARTA) v Thames PAM Jaya, Ltd, the judges might 
order to the representative plaintiffs to notify 800 potential members of drinking-water 
consumers who lived in Jakarta through public boards that still meet with r7(1) of the 
Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002(Ind). Otherwise, the judges ordered to notify 800 
potential members lived in Jakarta through the local newspaper that also meet with 
r7(1) of the Supreme Court Rules No 1 of 2002(Ind), but was not more efficient than 
through public boards.  
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court costs for poor litigants’. In r57 of the Fundamental of the Judiciary 
Power Act, No 48 of 2009 (Ind) stated:  
(1) Legal aid office is set up in every original court for litigants 
who cannot afford legal assistance; 
(2) Legal assistance referred to in paragraph (1) provided at no 
charge at all levels of the judiciary until the decisions on the 
matter has obtained the permanent legal force; 
 (3) Legal assistance and legal aid office referred to in paragraph 
(1) carried out in accordance with the related regulation. 
 These provisions are provided similarly at all levels, including 
general and limited jurisdiction.36 R56(2) and r57 of the Fundamental of the 
Judiciary Power Act, No 48 of 2009 (Ind) is implemented more generally by 
the Supreme Court Newslatter (SEMA) No 10 of 2010 (Ind) that also applies 
to all courts. Based on r56(2) and r57 of the Fundamental of the Judiciary 
Power Act  No 48 of 2009 (Ind), the government has the legal aid scheme, 
including not only contributing to but also undertaking court costs for poor 
litigants and/or the giving of legal assistance for no charge.   
The implementation of r56(2) and r57 of R1(1) of Fundamental of 
the Judiciary Power Act, No 48 of 2009 (Ind) can be seen in Appendix-A of 
SEMA No 10 of 2010(Ind), that provides:  
‘The provision and the implementation of the legal aid budget in 
the general jurisdiction are included for the establishment of the 
legal aid office, the cost assistance for the duty-lawyer, the 
indemnity of the court costs both in civil and criminal proceeding, 
and  the cost of inspection of real or personal property outside the 
court.’ 
‘A no charge’ proceeding can be applied for by everyone who cannot afford 
access to the court and who meets with the criteria as provided, after having 
a recommendation from the duty lawyer of Legal Aid Office.37 After any 
such application is approved by the judge, the cost of proceedings is then 
undertaken by the government’.38  Pursuant to r1(9) of Appendix-A of SEMA 
No 10 of 2010 (Ind), the ‘indemnity of court cost’ scheme applies to all civil 
litigation and criminal litigation. Accordingly, consumer class action as civil 
litigation should be included in that criteria if the representative plaintiffs 
cannot afford access to the court.  
                                                 
36   See, r68B & 69C of the Second Amandement Act No 2 of 1986 on the General Court, Act 
No 49 of 2009 (Ind);  r60B & 60C of the Second Amandement Act No 7 of 1989 on the  
Religion Court, Act No 50 of 2009 (Ind); r144C & 144D of the Second Amandement Act 
No 5 of 1986 on the Administrative Court, Act No 51 of 2009 (Ind). 
37  r8(c), r11 of Appendix-A of SEMA No 10 of 2010 (Ind). 
38  r18 of Appendix-A of SEMA No 10 of 2010(Ind). 
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R20(3) of Appendix-A of SEMA No 10 of 2010 (Ind), provides that the 
component of the civil lawsuit’s court costs includes: orders to call to present 
for parties, witnesses and experts, orders to notice the judgement, order to 
detain  property, orders to inspect real or personal property, office supplies 
expenses, documentary copies expenses, filing and binding of case 
documents expenses, and stamp expenses. Based on these components, it 
raises the question of whether it may embrace the court cost of 
consumer’class actions. These rules can be interpretated narrowly or widely, 
which may influence whether consumer’class proceeding can be embraced 
or not, since class action proceedings have the specific expense of  
notification to all members. If the cost of ‘order to call to present parties’ 
may be interpreted widely, the court then may order the Government to pay 
the cost of notification to all potential members in a class action. This may 
be a solution to the cost barrier in class actions.  
Even though the cost to notify potential class members may be 
interpreted as being embraced by the legal aid scheme, in fact, the 
Government budget in legal aid scheme cannot be relied upon, since the total 
budget to be shared for all programmes is very limited. For example, in 2010 
the total budget for legal aid in Indonesia was Rp3 250 000 000.39 As 
provided, it should be shared across all jurisdictions (one general jurisdiction 
and three limited jurisdictions) for a three scheme programme: providing 
Legal Aid offices, paying the duty lawyers, and bearing the court costs in 
‘no-charge’ proceeding for poor litigants. If it is shared in the same 
proportion, each scheme will recieve Rp1 083 333 333. If the ‘no-charge 
programme’ receives Rp1 083 333 333, that should be shared amongst 678 
original courts of general and limited jurisdictions, with each court only 
receiving Rp1 597 836 in a year.40 What can be expected with such a limited 
budget to assist with the cost barrier in class actions? One court would 
receive Rp1 597 836, which is insufficient to pay the cost of notification in a 
class action.  
The Indonesian Government ideally has good legislation which has in 
it the  responsibility to bear the court cost in general cases for poor litigants. 
However, it still raises the question of whether it includes the cost to notify 
consumer’class action or not. It also creates an expection that cannot be met, 
since the budget is very limited in implementation.  
 
 
                                                 
39  Available at   
http://www.badilum.info/images/stories/ortala/LAPTAH_Ditjen_Badilum_2010 
_part_1.pdf, 10 October 2011. 
40  For  the  total  number  of  the  court,  see    http://litbangdiklatkumdil.net/direktori-
pengadilan/, 14 November 2011. 
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Part Two: Learning  from Australia 
1. Class action in Australia: an introduction 
The different terminology of ‘representative proceeding,’ and ‘group 
proceeding’ or ‘class action’ are often used for the same purpose, but 
procedurally and conceptually, they have differences.  As Cashman 
overviewed: 
 The distinguishing characteristics relate primarily to (a) the ambit of 
the relief able to be sought, (b) the specificity of the rules relating to the 
commencement, conduct and conclusion of such proceeding, (c) the status, 
right, and responsibilities of those on whose behalf the proceeding are 
maintained and (d) the extent of potential liability for the costs of conducting 
or losing the litigation.41 
 Although there are differences between representative proceeding 
and class action, they have the same purpose: to eliminate the defficiency of 
the proceeding in which numerous persons are involved. Even in the Federal 
Court of Australia,  class action proceedings are called both ‘ representative 
proceedings’ and ‘grouped proceedings’.42 
Australia has now modernized its class action or grouped proceeding 
laws after the Australian Law Reform Commission gave their recomendation 
by inserting Pt.IVA in 1991 in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. This 
new provision came into effect on 4 March of 1992.43 Sec33C, Pt.IVA of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides:  
(1)  Subject to this Part, where: (a)  7 or more persons have 
claims against the same person; and (b)  the claims of all those 
persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or 
related circumstances; and (c)  the claims of all those persons 
give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact; a 
proceeding may be commenced by one or more of those persons 
as representing some or all of them.  
 Pt.IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 is applied in 
commonwealth jurisdiction and ssupplements the existing representative 
action procedures provided by Federal and territorial court rules.44  
Bamford found that in Australia, the provision of Pt.IVA of FCAA 
1976 had not initially been used as expected or feared by some.45 But more 
                                                 
41 Peter Cashman, Class Action Law and Practice, (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2007) 5. 
42 See, Part IVA of  the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (as inserted in 1991). See also, 
Div 9.3 of the Federal Court Rules of Australia 2011. 
43 See, Australia Law Reform Commission, Grouped Proceeding in the Federal Court, 
ALRC 46, (1988), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/46/; See 
also, the Comencement of The Federal Court of Australian Amandement Act 1991. 
44 Cashman, above n 49, 19. 
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recently, it has spread  into broader areas of law. According to the Chief 
Justice of the Federal Court, at the end of 2005 there had been 166 class 
actions commenced in the Federal Court since Pt.IVA of FCAA 1976 came 
into force in March 1992.46 From a study carried out by Peter Cashman, the 
class actions commenced in the Federal Court of Australia fall into the areas 
of: claims for economic loss arsing out of contracts, allegedly defective 
products, insolvent trading and claims by shareholders, human rights, 
discrimination and immigration cases, product liability claims, employment 
and industrial relation matters, proceedings by the Australian competition 
and Consumer Commission, native title claims, consumer claims, other tort 
and personal injuries, intellectual property, and taxation.47 
 
2. The cost provision in class action 
Litigation proceedings through the court, including civil litigation, results in 
costs for many procedures and orders. Generally, there are two primary costs 
rules: 
a. The [no cost] rule where each party bears its own costs. 
       In this rule, the court does not award costs to the successful party, so that 
each party bears his or her own costs of the litigation, regardless of the 
outcome.  
b. The [loser pays] rule (also referred to as the cost-shifting rule) 
       In this rule, the unsuccessful party will pay the successful party’s 
costs.48   
The usual rule applied in Anglo-Australian common law civil litigation is the 
loser pays costs rule,  where the unsuccessful party pays the successful 
party’s costs.49  
Based on procedural rules and pratice, the ALRC viewed that cost is 
a critical element of access to justice, a fundamental barrier to those wishing 
to pursue litigation, and for people caught up in the legal system it can 
                                                                                                                             
45 David Bamford, Class Action A Survey at Recent Cases: in summary (Legal Society of 
South Australia, October 2000) 2. 
46 Based on his speech to Class Action Conference in Melbourne, (December 2005), cited 
in Cashman, above n 49, 466. 
47  See, Ibid 467. 
48  See, Rachael Mulheron, The Class action in Common law legal system: a comparative 
perspective, (Hart  Publishing, Oxford, Portland Oregon, 2004) 436-38; ALRC, Costs 
Shifting-who pays for litigation?, Rep No 75 (1995), Overview: Access to justice and 
cost rules. 
49 As can be interpreted from the costs provision in Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 
and Federal Court of Rules 2011(Cth).  
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become an intolerable burden.50 As an illustration, the Federal minimum 
wage of worker per-month in Australia is AUD2357.2.51 The fee charged 
merely to commence lawsuit through the Federal court is AUD894, being 
37% of the minimum monthly wage of the worker.52 The fee to commence 
and a couple of minimum schedule of proceeding is AUD4047, being 171% 
of the minimum monthly wage of the worker.53 The cost to file a lawsuit 
may burden a person with a minimum income, and be more burdensome if 
they have to pay the solicitor cost. And what might be said of more complex 
matters like class proceedings? In P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Multiplex 
Limited, Maurice Blackburn Cashman (MBC) the initial estimate of the cost 
of running the action was in excess of $7.5 million! The actual estimate is 
confidential.54    
The loser-pays or cost-shifting rule is applied under the Australian 
Federal class action regime, as can be interpreted from s 33ZJ and s 43(1A) 
of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976.55 In proceedings brought under 
Pt IVA of the FCAA 1976, the Court can award costs against the 
representative party, a person appointed by the Court to represent a sub-
group or an individual group member who has been given leave to appear. 
The Court cannot award costs against any other person on whose behalf the 
proceedings have been commenced, except: (a) where in determining the 
issues, not all issues are common; (b) where in determining an issue that 
relates to individual issues.56 
Where the class action achieves a successful outcome of damages 
relief, the representative party may apply to the court for an order that an 
amount equal to the whole or a part of the assessed cost reasonably 
incurred in relation to the representative proceeding, recoverable by the 
person from the respondent, or, make any other order it thinks just.57  But 
where the action is unsuccessful, there is no provision in Australia for 
members of an unsuccessful class to be ordered by the court to contribute 
                                                 
50  ALRC, Costs Shifting-who pays for litigation?, above n 56, [2.2]. Many of the oral and 
written submissions made to the Commission in the course of this review, to show how 
they felt that the costs of civil proceeding very burden them. [2.5]. 
51   See at 
http://www.actu.org.au/HelpDesk/YourRightsfactsheets/MinimumWages.aspx#federal, 
224 November 2011. 
52  See the fee charged by the court at Federal Cout, avalaible at 
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/fff/ fff_feesandcosts_fees.html#filing, 24 November 2011. 
53   Ibid from the total fees of  schedule item No1, 15, 23, 24, 26.   
54  (2007) 1061 FCA 28. 
55  See also ALRC, Costs Shifting-who pays for litigation?, above 56, [16.25]-[16.26]. 
56  s43(1A) of the FCAA 1976; See also  s 33Q of the FCAA 1976; s 33R of the FCAA 
1976. 
57  Ibid s 33ZJ. 
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to costs, even where the representative plaintiff is a poor person with 
insufficient finance to satisfy any costs order made in favour of the 
successful defendant.  
Even though the loser-pays rule is applied in class actions, it has not 
precluded the Federal Court from making discretionary orders to overcome 
or minimize the costs problem in class proceedings. In Cook v Pasminco Ltd, 
Lindgren J ordered that  costs should be paid by the solicitors for the 
applicant on an indemnity basis, because the proceeding was not only 
untenable, but was brought irresponsibly without any, or any proper, 
consideration of the question whether it had any prospect of success.58 That 
practice means the representative plaintiffs can avoid the loser-pays rule, but 
only in cases where the solicitors represent the case in inappropriate way. 
Since the cost to file class action is still burdening and daunting to 
anyone who brings a class action, it should be sought how to overcome  that 
‘single most important issue’ while maintaining a cost structure which is fair 
to all parties.59 As Grave and Adam warned, without this issue being 
adequately addressed, the viability of representative proceedings is 
threatened.60 No one may ambit to be a representative plaintiff to commence 
class action, so that no advance of class action practices. 
3. Some recommendations and case law  
 To overcome or minimize the burden of costs in class proceeding, 
some recommendation have been proposed. Among them, there are three 
main recommendations that are interesting to discuss. 
a. Contingency and up-lift fee agreement 
 Contingency fee agreements and up-lift fee agreements are fee 
agreements made by the solicitor and the client where the lawyer’s fees are 
to be taken out of the proceeds, perhaps at a higher than usual rate and 
generally on a ’no-win no-fee’ basis. Conversely, a contingency fee 
agreement is where in the event of the successful outcome of the case, the 
lawyer will receive the payment of the lawyer’s ‘normal’ fee, which is fixed 
or a sliding percentage of the compensation awarded to the client.61 The 
                                                 
58 [2], (2000) 1819 FCA, 65, 66; See also, Cohen v the State of Victoria & ors, 
[2](2011)165 VSC, 52,54. 
59    See also, Mark J Rankin in David Bamford, Principles of Civil Litigation, (Thomson 
Reuther Australia Limited, Sydney, 2010) 252, that said the litigation cost is more 
siginifican issue than the other common criticism of civil litigation –delay. 
60    Damian Grave and Ken Adams, Class Action in Australia (Lawbook Co,Sydney, 2005) 
437. 
61    See, Morabito, Contingency Fee Agreement with Represented Persons in Class Action-
An Undesirable Australian Fenomen, 34 Common Law World Review (2005) Issue3, 
204, that cited his view from the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs. 
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amount of that fee depends on the amount of compensation awarded to the 
client. In an up-lift fee agreement, in the event of a successful outcome, the 
lawyer is paid on ‘top of the fee’ to cover the risk of the loss.62 The amount 
of that fee can be accounted for, since the fee has been fixed, and the ‘top of 
the fee’ to cover the risk is agreed in a certain percentage of that fixed fee, 
for example 25-40% of the fixed fee.  
Contingency fee agreements for class proceeding are not recognized 
in the Australia Federal Court,63 and some Profesional Conduct Rules 
prohibit them.64 Otherwise, the court has permitted the uplift fee agreement 
between client and legal practitioner. In a way, this provides an incentive for 
legal practitioners to represent class actions.65   
These two kinds of cost agreements may be used to lighten the cost 
barrier in class action, but do not relieve the litigant from the risk of an 
adverse party-party costs order that he/she still should pay to the successful 
defendant. The litigants still face the burden of party-party costs in class 
actions that is consequently more expensive than in non-class actions.  
b. Public legal funding, legal aid, and pro bono 
Public legal funding means a funding scheme provided by the Government to 
assist litigants in finance since they deal with matters of public importance.66 
Before it was created, public interest litigation funding had been 
recommended by the ALRC to be provided for in legislation, but such has not 
been accepted by the Government.67 So, there is no legislative provision 
relating to public interest litigation funding.  
Otherwise, the Federal Government through the Attorney-General’s 
Departement has a kind of public legal funding scheme, namely a ‘Financial 
                                                 
62    Ibid. Morabito cited the definition from the Trade Practices Commission. 
63    But some states have practiced it, e.g South Australian Legal Assistance Fund; Western 
Australian Litigation Assistance Fund, ALRC, Costs Shifting-who pays for litigation, 
above 56, nn 61,62. 
64 See, Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW),Ch3, Pt 3.2, Div 5, s325; Legal Professional Act 
2004, as amanded by No 12 2007 (Vic), s 3.4.29; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), 
s42(6c); Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2011(SA), r 16C.1dan 16C.3; 2007 
Barrister Rule (Qld), r120;  
65 See,Eg, Cook v Pasminco Ltd [2], (2000), 107 FCR 44, 54, 476; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v 
Esso Australia Ltd (1999) 166 ALR 731, 736-37 (per Merkel J); Courtney v Medtel Pty 
Limited(No. 5) [2004] FCA 1406, 58 (per Sackville J), Williams v FAI Home Security 
Pty Ltd [3] (2000) FCA 1438, 13 (per Goldberg J), cited in Vince Morabito, above n 69, 
34 Comm L. World Rev (2005) 203-05 nn 6, 11, 14, 16; Also in [2011] VSC 614, 29. 
66See, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/AllDocs/B7A8300F7D9B7876CA2578770007
2 93A?OpenDocument#commonwealthpublicinterest, 13 October 2011. 
67    See, ALRC, Costs Shifting-who pays for litigation, above 56, [18.2]; Public interest 
litigation  by means of  a mechanism for clarifying legal issues to the benefit of the 
general community. 
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Assistance Scheme’. Based on sec.4.12 of the Guidelines For the Provision of 
Assistance By Commonwealth For Legal And Related Expenses Under 
Commonwealth Public Interest And Test Cases Scheme (August 1996), all 
civil proceedings in Australian courts and tribunals are covered since they 
deal with matters of public importance.68 Consequently, it should include 
assisting class actions, in the instance where a class action deals with the 
matters of public importance. 
The State governments also have a Legal Aid scheme that assists 
litigants cannot afford socially or economically to access justice, but have 
merit in a case, or to assist in public interest cases. In Legal Aid scheme the 
government mainly provides legal assistance, while in public legal funding, 
the Government assists  financially. The Legal Aid can provide free services 
for legal information and minor assistance, and/ or a legal representation.69  
Some states have provided for legal aid schemes. For example, Victoria 
Legal Aid,70 New South Wales Legal Aid Commission,71 New South Wales’ 
Law and Justice Foundation (that provides a contingency legal assistance 
fund (CLAFs)).72 Legal Aid schemes mainly focus on assisting persons who 
cannot afford socially or economically to access justice, but have merit in a 
case, or to assist with public interest cases. So, Legal Aid does not address 
class action specifically, even though it may be interpreted as being 
embraced by that scheme. No data founded. 
Some Legal Practitioner’ Association in some states also run a pro 
bono services scheme, that assist in legal assistance for unwealthy people or 
for public interest cases. For example, the Public Interest Law Clearing 
House of Victoria,73 of New South Wales,74 and of Queensland,75 the ACT 
Law Society Pro Bono Clearing House, New South Wales Bar Association 
Legal Assistance Referral Scheme (LARS),76 the New South Wales Law 
Society Community Referral Service Pro Bono Scheme (PBS),  Bar 
                                                 
68See, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/AllDocs/B7A8300F7D9B7876CA2578770007
2 93A?OpenDocument#commonwealthpublicinterest, 13 October 2011. 
69  http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Legalaid_LegalAidProgram, 13 October 
2011. 
70http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/justlib/DOJ+Internet/Home/Courts/Going 
+to +Court/Legal+Aid/ 
71  http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/get-legal-help/help-at-court. 
72http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/app/&id=A18BD89AC5777376CA25716200154DFD
, 3 October 2011. 
73  http://www.pilch.org.au/individuals/. 
74  See, National Pro Bono Resource Centre, History of Australian Pro Bono Schemes, The 
White House Uniiversity of NSW, May 2006, at http://www.nationalprobono.org.au/ 
documents/ReferralSchemeshistoryreportfinal.pdf, 14 October 2011. 
75  Ibid. 
76  See, Ch.3, Pt3.1, Div 7 of Legal Professional Act 2004 (NSW). 
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Assosiation of Queensland, Law Institute of Victoria Legal Assistance 
Scheme (LIVLAS), the Victorian Bar Legal Assistance Scheme (VBLAS), 
the Law Society of Western Australia Law Access Public Interest Law 
Clearing House (WAPILCH),77 and Litigation assistance fund run by the 
Legal Practitioner’s Association of South Australia.78 It is unclear, whether 
class proceedings can be assisted by these schemes, since class proceedings 
are costly and lengthy forms of litigation.  There are also some 
organisational funders, for instance: PIAC (Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre),79Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,80and the 
Green (in Justice Policy), 81 that assist in public interest cases, including 
consumer cases.  
The public legal funding, Legal Aid scheme and pro bono are mainly 
used for individual cases involving unwealthy persons or public interest 
cases. It still raises the question of whether these schemes may embrace 
assisting class action regularly, given the added expense and complexities 
involved. 
c. Commercial litigation funder 
The other solution to overcome the cost barrier in class actions is by 
using commercial litigation funders. Commercial litigation funders are a 
private funder, personal or corporate, based on a funding agreement that 
provides finance to litigants. The commercial funder works for profit. They 
take, in agreement, a certain amount as their funding fee from the litigants.   
In Australia, to date, class proceedings have been funded primarily by 
lawyers acting for representative parties.82 Commercial litigation funders 
have funded several class action proceedings. In the event of a victory by the 
plaintiff class, funders seek reimbursement of their expenditures as well as 
the payment of between 20 per cent and 45 per cent of the compensation that 
the class members will be entitled to receive from the litigation.83  This is a 
great amount and is one of the incentives for commercial litigation funders to 
fund class action. The limits on contigency fees do not apply to them. 
There are some large law firms and some commercial litigation 
funders that have funded class actions.84 Only large litigation funders can 
                                                 
77  See, National Pro Bono Resource Centre, above n 82. 
78  See, Pt 2, s 14A of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). 
79  See, http://www.piac.asn.au/legal/public-interest-cases, 5 October 2011. 
80  See, http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/585905. 
81  See, http://greens.org.au/policies/human-rights-democracy/justice. 
82    Damian Grave and Ken Adams, Class Action in Australia (Lawbook Co,Sydney, 2005), 
466. 
83 Vince Morabito, The Victorian Law Reform Commission's Class Action Reform 
Strategy, VLRC Repport (Vol 15 No 2) 114 nn 34. 
84   http://www.slatergordon.com.au/areas-of-practice/victoria/general-legal-services/class-
actions; http://www.mauriceblackburn.com.au/areas-of-practice/class-actions/past-
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afford to fund class proceedings, since they are a costly form of litigation, 
and a cost agreement based on a no-win no-fee  basis may mean being out of 
pocket by millions of dollars even if successful. In deciding whether to fund, 
commercial litigation funders will consider the prospective chance of 
success. Prof. Morabito has  advised that a likely success rate of 80 per cent 
is required, by plaintiff law firms before a class action proceeding may be 
instituted.85 
 The judges also welcome such funding agreements, as far as it will not 
interupt the autonomy of litigation. In Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v 
Fostif Pty Limited, the Court of Appeal concluded that: 
‘…whether proceedings funded by a litigation funder are an 
abuse of process depends on whether the role of that funder "has 
corrupted or is likely to corrupt the processes of the court to a 
degree that attracts the extraordinary jurisdiction to dismiss or 
stay permanently for abuse of process.” In the present matters… 
there was no abuse of process. First, the proceedings were under 
judicial supervision; second, Firmstones' control of the litigation 
was "not excessive"; third, Firmstones' fees were not excessive; 
fourth, there was a solicitor on the record; and fifth, the individual 
claims were small (making separate recovery processes 
unlikely)’ 86  
The court will be willing to accept commercial litigation funding where there 
is no unacceptable risk of abuse of the court process. The practices of 
funding litigation should not breach public policy as prohibited by  s32 of 
Wrong Act 1958 (Vic), s6 of Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry 
Abolition Act 1993 (NSW), s3 of Sch 11 of Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
(SA). 
It is shown that Australia even faces cost barriers to class actions. 
The cost barrier in class actions encompasses the whole of legal costs, and 
these become more costly in class actions, not only because of the cost of 
notification to all potential members but because of the added complexities 
involved. As described, the Australian civil justice system has some 
solutions to the cost barrier in class actions, and the most popular is 
commercial litigation funding. 
 
                                                                                                                             
class-actions.aspx; http://www.imf.com.au/pdf/AnnualReport2011.pdf;http://www.hill 
crestlitigation.com. au/ 
financial_reports/ASX%20Quarterly%20Report%2031%20December%202010.pdf;  
85  Morabito, The Victorian Law Reform Commission's Class Action Reform Strategy, 
above n 91, 117, nn 83 
86  (2006), 41FCR 63; See also P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Multiplex Limited, (2007) 
1061 FCA 28. That case has been funded by ILF. 
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Part Three: the Proposal of Litigation Funding Model for Indonesia 
 The cost barrier in class actions for Indonesian litigants, unlike 
Australian litigants, is the cost to notify all potential members of the group 
respresented. Although Australia and Indonesia face different types of cost 
barriers, both nevertheless face a barrier to engaging in class actions.  
As the ALRC indicated, none of these litigation funding schemes 
may offer a complete solution, but some are better than others.87 Having 
third parties fund litigation is the main factor in influencing the success of 
litigation funding schemes. These third parties include the government, who 
wish to provide legal aid funding and public purpose funding, and lawfirms 
or large companies who can carry out litigation funding as a profitable 
business. Let to know more about their limitation works and how to advance 
them to Indonesia. 
 
1. Legal aid and pro bono schemes 
These two alternatives may not necessarily be implemented well in 
Indonesia. As exlained in part one, the legal aid scheme by the Indonesian 
Government has a limited budget that is unlikely to undertake all 
applications for legal aid, let alone for class action applications. Indonesia 
also has pro bono legal representation that is generally provided by a non 
profit  public legal service institution, like Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI) that has many representative-offices at many 
regions in Indonesia,88 In fact, they generally have a limited budget to fund 
to support their pro bono legal representation programme, including class 
actions.89 As provided in r1(1) of Apendix_A of The Supreme Court 
NewsLetter No 10 of 2010 (Ind), the Government assists with the cost for the 
duty-lawyer that is often carried out by the public legal service institution, 
and even by professional lawyers. 
The legal aid and pro bono scheme, including ‘indemnity of court-
cost’ scheme and ‘cost assistance for duty-lawyer’ scheme may become one 
of the solutions to the cost barrier in class actions in Indonesia: if the 
Government includes the cost of notification to all potential members as a 
component of the court-cost to be undertaken by the government;  given this, 
the Government should reform its legal aid budget appropriately to support 
class action.  
                                                 
87   See, ALRC, Grouped Proceeding in the Federal Court, above n 51, 106-107. 
88    See, http://www.ylbhi.or.id/index.php?cx=1&cy=2, 7 October 2011. 
89    See the failed to continue class action in Seven consumers v Guyub Raharjo Co; in 12 
Activists v Minister of Economic of Indonesia, cs; in victims of G30S/PKI’ labeling v 
President of Republic Indonesia. 
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2. Public legal funding 
  Unlike the legal aid and pro bono schemes that have as their basic 
principle access to justice for the poor, public legal funding has a different 
basic principle. As pursuant to the terminology, public legal funding 
highlights the public interest. Can the public purposes funding scheme be 
applied in funding class actions?  
Class actions have two functions: private interest and public 
interest.90 On one hand, class action works for the private interest, since it 
seeks comepnsation for individuals. On the other hand, class action works in 
the public interest, since the commencement of class proceeding sometimes 
serves as an important regulatory function, for instance, it may have a 
positive influence on product design decisions in trade practices class 
actions. Australia does not mention that function and even if class actions as 
a whole are not regarded as being public interest, some class actions are and 
would be covered by the public purposes funding. 
Class actions have a public interest function and help the government 
prosecute anyone or companies that breach public interest law area, 
including trade practices or environment law. Even if the government 
doesn’t do the public interest law enforcement, for instance in the 
environment law breaches that embrace a public interest loss,  the inisiatif of 
any one who want to be a representative plaintiff to bring class action should 
be supported.91  In case that the government doesn’t do its duty, it is 
reasonable, that the budget to inisitiate the prosecution by the government 
replaced then, for supporting the class action for the same purpose, by any 
one. So, public purposes funding scheme is considerable to be implemented 
for funding class action that involves public interest.  
The private interest class action may be funded by legal aid and pro 
bono schemes, where all the members are ‘the persons in straw’. As 
‘providing access to jutice for the poor’ can be included in public policy, it 
makes it a public interest obligation. Accordingly, funding to private interest 
class action (where all members are ‘the persons in straw’) can be included 
in a public purposes funding scheme.  
                                                 
90  Jamie Cassels and Craig Jones, The Law of A Large Scale Claims, Product Liability, 
Mass Torts, and Complex Litigation in Canada, (Irwin Law,  Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 
2005) 369. 
91  For example, Indonesia Government didn’t do so relating  with “Lapindo Brantas-
Sidohardjo” case, as entitled in r90(1) of the Protection and the Management of 
Environment Act No 32 of 2009 (Ind), that provides:  the Government agencies 
responsibly in environmental, entitled to  file the damages or injunction relief civil 
lawsuit against those act or enterprise that caused the damages and polution to the 
environment. 
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The resources of legal aid and public purposes funding are from the 
government budget. If funding to overcome the cost barrier is from the 
government budget, then the viability of the class action regime is dependent 
on the political will of the government. This is another problem in a 
developing country like Indonesia. Providing legal funding by the 
government solely (whether in legal aid funding or a public purposes funding 
scheme) may become burdensome. In spite of what the government provides, 
the amount will not be as much as expected, since the total budgets to be 
shared for all programmes will be limited. For example, in 2010 the total 
budget for legal aid services in Indonesia were Rp.3 250 000 000 (more and 
less AUD 361 111).92 It must be shared across all jurisdictions, and over 
three scheme programmes: Providing Legal Aid Posts, providing duty 
lawyers, and bearing the costs proceeding in free-costs programme for poor 
litigants. If it is shared equally across programmes, each will recieve Rp.1 
083 333 333 (approximately AU $ 120 370). What can be expected with 
such a limited budget? Alternatively, it should be recommended that there be 
another legal funding scheme for those who fall into the middle economic 
status. 
 
3. Commercial legal funders 
 A commercial legal funder has to manage the litigation funding as a 
prospective investment, where they will consider, before agreeing to 
litigation, the likely success rate of the case, so that they do not suffer an 
unacceptable risk of financial loss. IMF Ltd as a commercial claimant 
litigation funder has raised its investment to fund group action. It was raised 
from $526 million in 2006 to $ 926 million in 2008.93 
Indonesia has no model and experience with the commercial 
litigation funding. It believed that none of the commercial entities have 
knowledged those ‘profitable investment’. Learning from the success of the 
commercial litigation funder in Australia may encourage the growth of 
commercial litigation funders in Indonesia. The more prevalent and willing 
commercial funders become, the more  cost barriers to class actions can be 
reduced, if not eliminated. Every applicant that fails to access legal aid 
funding or public purposes funding, may have a chance to get funding from a 
commercial funder. 
                                                 
92 http://www.badilum.info/images/stories/ortala/LAPTAH_Ditjen_Badilum_2010_part_ 1. 
pdf. 10 October 2011. 
93  Wayne Attrill, Litigation Funding: Access to Justice in a Time of Economic Crisis, 
presented at Globalaw Asia Pacific Regional Meeting, (Auckland, 20 February 2009) at 
http://www.imf.com.au/pdf/Globalaw%20Conference%20-%20Feb%202009.pdf, 10 
October 2011. 
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The limitation of commercial litigation funding is that it only takes 
cases that are likely to be. Accordingly, the prospective applicant or his/her 
lawyer should have an appropriate civil matter, a real issue of fact relevant to 
determination of the matter, or the legal arguments in relation to the matter 
should be dealt with adequately by written submissions, so that it can be well 
considered and funded by the funder. Conversely, cases with unsuccesful 
prospects will be left alone. But, it is considerable that no one should file a 
lawsuit frivolously, vexatiously, or that has no legal argumentation in 
relation to the matter. 
 
4. The combining model to be proposed: Class Action Funding Support 
Agency 
 Based on this comparitve study, all three litigation funding models 
are likely to be adopted by Indonesia. These are legal aid scheme, public 
legal funding, and commercial legal funders.  With regard to the limitation of 
each and in the context of the Indonesian situation, it may be recommended 
that a combining model, named Class Action Funding Support Agency, be 
adopted. This funding body model will work: 
a. independently to support in financing all kinds of class action. 
The agency should work independently, so that it can serve all kinds of 
class action lawsuits fairly, even against government agencies. 
b. both profitably and non-profitably pursuant to the economic status of the 
applicants. 
Such an agency may work profitably, in a certain class action lawsuit, so 
that it can support the viability and the advancement of the agency, in 
case the government cannot support its finances satisfactorily. 
c. with or without repayment and a certain percentage of any funds 
recovered by applicants if the settlement succeeds for the applicant who 
is to be funded. 
The repayment and receiving a certain percentage of any funds recovered 
by applicants if the settlement succeeds, in a certain class action lawsuits,  
will also support the viability and the adcancement of the agency. 
d. raise funding resources from the government (from the compulsory legal 
aid funding scheme), and from commercial entities (by agreement).  
Since the Indonesian government has a compulsory commitment to the 
access to justice for the poor and public interest services based on Acts 
and Rules, that has its source from the moral principle in Pancasila, it is 
worth using the budget to implement these principles by way of a class 
action funding support agency, that should report the finance 
transparently. The placing of the legal aid funding arrangement into the 
class action funding support agency may be more effective the current 
bureaucracy, since the government bureaucracy often times results in 
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delays and complexities. Funding must also come from beyond the 
government. Getting the funding resources from commercial entities also 
supports the viability and the advancement of the agency, and as a media 
for the commercial entities to make profits by way litigation funding.  
 
Conclusion 
 Looking at some Australian provisions and practices, and with 
respect to the Indonesian situation, the solution to the cost barrier in class 
actions for Indonsian litigants may be expressed in the terms of: 
1. Optimizing the principles of having ‘the judges involved’ and ‘the 
efficiency of justice’ to arrange the most efficient way of notifying all 
group members. 
2. Supporting the growth of commercial litigation funders based on rules. 
3. Establishing a funding support body, like, the class action funding 
support agency by the Government, that: 
a. works independently to support financially all kinds of class action. 
b. both profitably and non-profitably pursuant to the economic status of 
the applicants. 
c. with or without repayment and a certain percentage of any funds 
recovered by applicants if the settlement succeeds for the applicant 
who is to be funded. 
d. raises the funding resources from the government from the 
compulsory legal aid funding scheme and from  commercial entities 
(by agreement). 
The two main litigation funders,  the commercial funder and the class action 
funding support agency, then may work in harmony. Where a class action 
lawsuit cannot be supported financially by the commercial funder, it may be 
supported by the  class action funding support agency . If the applicant is 
unsuccessful in securing a commercial funder, he/she may move then, to the 
“class action funding support agency” that may offer a favourable 
arrangement.  
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